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Dolph: Peacekeeping in Bosnia

I. DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE
Prior to 1944, no term existed to differentiate between what we accept
today to be genocide and war crimes, despite the significant and important
difference of motive. In the wake of World War Two (WWII) as the full terror of
the extermination and concentration camps in Germany emerged into the public
spotlight, it became clear that the acts committed against the Jewish people were
far different from war crimes. Winston Churchill stated that the atrocities
challenging the international community were, “A crime that has no name.”1 The
lack of precedent in both degree and nature from which to address this newly
distinguished crime added to the ambiguity surrounding its recognition and
prosecution for decades to come. However, in 1944 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish
Jew who served as an adviser to the United States War Ministry published a book
titled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which sought to define this unnamed crime.
Lemkin argued that, “New conceptions require new terminology,”2 and thus he
assigned the word ‘genocide’ to describe these crimes. The word ‘genocide’ has
shared roots in both Greek and Latin, with the Greek word ‘genos’ meaning race
or tribe and the Latin word ‘cide’ meaning to kill. The first definition of genocide
as defined by Lemkin explicated, “The destruction of a nation or of an ethnic
group.”3 His definition included the execution of a calculated and coordinated
plan, which seeks to destroy its victims due in entirety to their membership of a
selected group of people.
On December 9, 1948 the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly
passed Resolution 260 (III) A, endorsing a more comprehensive definition of the
word ‘genocide.’
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, as such:
•
•
•
•

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
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•

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 4

From its conception in Lemkin’s book to the U.N. endorsement of a more
encompassing definition, the ambiguity of genocide has proven detrimental to
humanitarian intervention since WWII. While the intention of the perpetrator is
vital to the recognition and classification of genocide, it is nearly impossible to
unanimously determine the true intentions of such perpetrators, particularly in the
midst of civil wars and state violence. As this research will explore, frequently
genocide is disguised either intentionally or accidentally by deep ethnic and racial
tensions and feuds.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was
composed of six republics; Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia,
Montenegro, and Slovenia. Until his death in 1980, Marshal Tito ruled the former
Yugoslavia for forty-five years as a communist state. Under his leadership, Tito
pursued the goals of brotherhood and unity, seeking to eliminate ethnic definition
despite the ethnic diversity of the Republic.
Following Tito’s death, SFRY experienced rising nationalist movements
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. After an aggressive nationalist movement,
Serbian president Slobodan Milošević seceded from the Republic in June 1991,
followed by a brief ten-day war. Following Milosevic’s lead, Croatia declared
independence soon after, however due to the fact that Croatia had both desirable
coastline and a Serb minority, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) refused to let
the nation secede. This disagreement resulted in a longer seven-month war which
left 10,000 dead and 700,000 displaced. 5
As the surrounding nations sought to secede from SFRY, Bosnia was
caught in the middle of an increasingly dangerous predicament. Bosnia’s
population was the most diverse of all the SFRY nations as its composition was
43% Muslin, 35% Orthodox Serb, and 18% Roman Catholic Croat. If Bosnia
remained part of SFRY, due to Milosevic’s rising power, Bosnian Muslim’s and
Croat’s would face abuses. If Bosnia chose to secede, Muslims would have no
protective base within SFRY, as the Bosnian-Serbs could retreat to Serbia and the
4
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Bosnian-Croats could retreat to Croatia, but Muslims had no ethnic homeland
within SFRY, making them the responsibility of the international community.
Unsure of how to proceed, Bosnia turned to the United States and Europe
for help. In response they suggested that Bosnia hold a referendum on
independence, and offer human rights protection to its Muslim citizens.
Additionally, to demonstrate their opposition to Milosevic’s aggression, in 1991
the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. Despite its
intentions, the embargo only intensified the situation for Muslims and Croats who
had no means of defense and no access to weapons upon the enactment of the
embargo. On the contrary, the Bosnian Serbs were backed by the JNA, which was
both controlled by and largely composed of Serbs.
Following the recommendations provided by Europe and the U.S, Bosnia
held a referendum in March 1992 in which 94.4% voted to secede from SFRY.
However, the Bosnian presidency at the time was composed of two Muslims, two
Serbs, two Croats and one Yugoslav. After the referendum the two Serb members
of the presidency resigned and declared the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb
state backed by Milošević within the borders of old Serbia. The JNA contributed
80,000 troops to the new Bosnian Serb army, demonstrating additional support.
Shortly after, the Serbs began their systematically engineered process of
ethnic cleansing, which followed a four step pattern. The calculated Serb plan was
aimed at undermining any Muslim resistance by killing, mistreating and deporting
Muslims from their lands. The first step of this systematic process was the
establishment of military control over Bosnia, which the Serbs began in the cities.
The next step moved to establish Serb domination in the countryside; this step
required delaying anti-Muslim action so the Serbs could actually use Muslims to
fill ranks. Once both the countryside and city had been captured, the Serbs began
anti-Muslim actions and the process of creating an ethnically ‘clean’ Bosnia.
Finally, the Serbs limited access to Bosnia by international observers in order to
minimize the chances of quick international intervention and allow control over
how the situation was portrayed internationally.
The anti- Muslim campaign began with subtle actions then escalated
rapidly, following typical patterns of ethnic cleansing. Initially, the Serbs began
by limiting employment opportunities available to non-Serbs and imposing rules
stripping non-Serbs of their basic freedoms, signifying the beginning of a brutal
Serb offensive aimed at creating an ethnically homogenous state in Bosnia.
Within days of the secession, Bosnian Serb soldiers created lists of Muslim and
Croat intellectuals, musicians and professionals and began their systematic
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tortures and executions. Serb soldiers began to destroy religious and cultural sites
in order to completely purge Bosnia of the cultures and memories of Muslims or
Croats. In destroying the cohesion of their communities and cultures, the identity
of the Muslim people was also destroyed, causing the Muslim community to lose
their will to resist and thus making it easier for the Serbs to uproot and displace
them.
In order to truly ensure ethnic purity in Bosnia, and serving as an
indicator of Serb intentions, sexual warfare was used on a large scale. Serb
soldiers forced fathers to castrate their sons, and molest their daughters. Rape was
also used as a tool of war against young women with the intent of impregnating
them in order to destroy the purity and continuance of non-Serbs races.
Serb run concentration camps began to appear all over Bosnia. Serbs
forced Muslims and Croats from all over Bosnia into camps where they were
humiliated and tortured, frequently resulting in death. Muslim and Croat women
were forced into rape camps.
As the international community began to acknowledge and question Serb
actions and intentions in Bosnia, Milošević denied the acts, attributing them to
inevitable realities of warfare, like most leaders committing genocide do.
Milošević used three predominant arguments to justify his claims of Serb
innocence. Primarily, he argued that Muslims had committed identical crimes as
the ones Serbs were accused of, portraying a situation of civil war grounded in
ethnic feuds rather than genocide. Secondly, Milošević argued that the deaths
were the inevitable consequence of combat and civil war. Finally, he argued that
the Muslims deserved the treatment they were getting, and that the Serb actions
were benefiting the Western world by eliminating Muslims. Milošević was quoted
repeating a popular Nazi euphemism, “The key to the entire operation from a
psychological standpoint was never to utter the words that would be appropriate
to the action. Say nothing; do these things; do not describe them.” 6 Milošević’s
attempts to conceal the nature of the situation in Bosnia demonstrate that he was
fully aware of the power that an engaged citizenry has in influencing
humanitarian intervention.
By the time the international community finally stepped in to stop the
genocide, 200,000 Bosnians has been killed, two million had been displaced and
the European republic had been divided into three separate and ethnically clean
states.
6
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III. A NEW TYPE OF WAR
A significant factor which influenced the shape of humanitarian
intervention in Bosnia was the lack of precedent surrounding this new type of
war. The types of wars represented by situations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and
Kosovo were situations that emerged in the post-Cold War era. This new category
of war was less likely to result from power conflicts between dominant nations,
and more likely to come from the propagation of civil wars fueled by ethnic and
racial conflict. These wars posed a challenge to the international community as
they were less significant in themselves, but in their accumulation had the
potential to trigger wider conflicts. The humanitarian issues represented within
these conflicts also had immense potential to deteriorate the moral fundamentals
of newly established liberal international order. Due to the infancy of these types
of war, the international community had no precedent from which to address these
situations. No framework existed to provide guidance, and, due to their roots in
ethnic feuds, cultural barriers proved to be a driving force preventing intervention.
The president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Les Gelb, addressed
this problem in 1994. "The core problem is wars of national debilitation, a steady
run of uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation-states and gnawing at
the well-being of stable nations. These 'teacup' wars can spill over into the wider
region, drawing larger states into conflict. There is also a moral cost, the failure to
deal adequately with such strife, to do something about mass murder and
genocide, corrodes the essence of a democratic society. If democratic leaders turn
away from genocide or merely pretend to combat it, their citizens will drink in the
hypocrisy and sink into cynicism."7
IV. THE QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
In all genocides following the Holocaust, the “gray area” of moral
ambiguity surrounding the concept and definition of genocide has been exploited
by policy makers to support inaction or insufficient action.
The post WWII era represented an era in which nations were being held to
increasingly higher standards regarding human rights, democratic rule,
humanitarian justice and rule of law. Single world standards were emerging which
acknowledged certain rights that all people are entitled to enjoy, and which both
independent states and the international community are obligated to protect and
observe. Human rights were becoming an integral component of international
politics. Problematically, the international community had yet to define a
7
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mechanism or process by which it could respond to flagrant offenders with the
force and authority needed to mitigate humanitarian crises.
The growth of human rights peaked throughout the 1940’s beginning with
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech establishing the importance of protecting human
rights. In 1943, the U.S. State Department drafted a charter for a planned world
organization that included the International Bill of Rights. The Nuremberg War
Tribunal and the United Nations charter both placed an emphasis on human
rights. In December of 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human rights was
adopted. Although the Cold War temporarily slowed the spread of human rights,
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 placed human rights more evenly between East
and West. The election of US president Jimmy Carter in 1976 and even Ronald
Regan in 1980 further boosted the push for human rights.
A few main factors are responsible for driving the human rights norm.
First, Western states in the wake of WWII pushed strongly for a world
establishment that would not only work to maintain peace, but that would also
serve as a protector for specific basic human rights. The same Western leaders
who championed the United Nations (UN) also championed the proliferation of
universal liberal political norms that would protect basic human rights. The
American preoccupation with the promotion of democracy also added immensely
to the global push for human rights, as democracy and human rights are closely
intertwined. While Western states were one force driving human rights, two other
groups contributed significantly to the strength of the movement. Citizen
movements and non-governmental organizations worked tirelessly to pursue
human rights, and UN declarations provided the foundation they needed to build a
more legally binding international law protecting human rights.
The movement for human rights culminated in a transition from human
rights as part of interstate law to a law of humanity. Interstate law represents the
way human rights had previously been promulgated, where rights were articulated
and secured by the state. The transition to law of humanity shifted the
responsibility of articulating and defending human rights to the global
community.
V. GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE
Before assessing the roles of international peacekeeping bodies in relation
to the genocide in Bosnia, it is necessary to understand the global diplomatic
climate and evaluate the likely effect it had in shaping intervention. Historically,
after major wars peace settlements allow the victors and emergent powers to
define new rules and institutions to govern post-war global order. However, in the
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wake of the Cold War, no such actions occurred, resulting in a perplexing
combination of new norms, enforced by old institutions, uni-polar U.S. power,
uncertain leadership and declining political authority within the international
community. Three trends also are responsible for the confusing post-Cold war
global order. Primarily, the rise of humanitarian and human rights standards in the
absence of an international mechanism capable of enforcement left the global
community with poorly defined standards. Second, the transformation of NATO
after WWII left the world with uncertain leadership and an inefficient
enforcement organization. Finally, the international distribution of power
following WWII and the Cold-War had become radically uni-polar, leaving the
U.S. as the only serious military power in the world.
Out of the confusion and complexity of post-war international order arose
two trends. Primarily, constructive American participation became crucial to the
global quest for solutions to problems of security, justice, economic growth and
political governance. 8 However, the uneven distribution of power made it
increasingly difficult for smaller countries to cooperate with the large and erratic
superpower that the U.S. had become. Despite its position within the global
community, the U.S. remained uncertain about how much global leadership it was
willing to provide, what its obligations were within the international community,
and how much it wanted to sacrifice its own welfare in the interest of promoting
and protecting human rights. The second trend that arose was due to the absence
of new international agreements following the Cold-War. Due to this absence, the
international community had no guidance in terms of upholding new human rights
and humanitarian justice standards and thus was forced to adhere to informal
governance methods. These methods proved to be inconsistent and insufficient
due to their informality.
VI. ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The role of the U.S. in post-Cold War order was immensely significant to
its role in Bosnia, and magnifies its shortcomings. U.S. emergence from the Cold
War as the world’s only super power meant that the U.S. played a vital role in
shaping the international community’s ability to respond to state crimes and
humanitarian abuses. However, the U.S. was also viewed as a ‘bully’ within the
international community, raising concerns about the consequences of un-checked
American power, such concerns peaked during the Clinton Administration. While
the U.S. championed enlightened self-interest and humanitarian intervention, U.S.
pre-eminence within the international community proved a barrier to the
8
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emergence of institutions with the capacity to uphold and enforce the international
community’s newly defined human rights standards.
Domestically, much of the American public was expressing weakening
support for global engagement and intervention. The rising costs of foreign aid,
UN membership dues, regional security partnerships and multilateral economic
cooperation, enhanced hesitations regarding humanitarian intervention. American
presidents and the mainstream policy establishment faced increasing struggles
with major political factions who wanted to cut back international involvement
and return the focus to domestic issues. Thus, despite its leadership role, the US
was just as conflicted regarding the proper use of force in terms of humanitarian
intervention as was the rest of the world.
The public was divided on this issue as two conflicting beliefs emerged
regarding foreign policy. One side believed that as a world-power, and following
the precedent set in the Gulf War, the US was morally obligated to intervene on
the behalf of any country facing aggression. This belief was championed by
liberal humanitarianists. On the contrary, the other side championed the belief
that international affairs were not the business or responsibility of the US
regardless of its position within the international community, unless they posed a
threat to national safety or interests. This side was represented by selective
engagers.
Selective engagers dominated President George H. W. Bush’s
administration from 1989 to 1993, as well as the senior military officer corps,
who believed strongly that US military intervention should be reserved for remote
incidents in which US strategic interests were directly threatened or attacked.
With the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans had both
dramatically decreased in strategic importance to the US. Throughout 1991 and
the majority of 1992 selective engagers opposed any type of US military
intervention in either Somalia or Bosnia. Additionally, for selective engagers, the
dissolution of Yugoslavia was initially seen as a concern only to the extent that
proliferation of ethnic and racial hatreds threatened to create regional instability.
Based upon this analysis, selective engagers believed that the best approach to the
problem was to endorse some centralized authority supporting gradual change.
From the beginning of the crisis in 1990 until the outbreak of war in Croatia in
June of 1991 and Bosnia in March of 1992, the Bush administration focused its
attention on emergent strategies that would prevent or at least postpone the
collapse of SFRY. Upon the outbreak of war, selective engagers maintained their
position, simply shifting their attention from prevention to containment. Given
that few opposing views existed, the public supported the Bush administration’s
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policy of containment as a necessity to prevent the situation from spreading to
areas like Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria; areas that
did represent geo-strategic interests to the US.
Liberal humanitarianists initially held less political power domestically,
representing a minute fraction of Congress, and instead composing humanitarian
and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Unlike selective
engagers, liberal humanitarianists supported military intervention in Bosnia to
both halt the Serb offensive against civilians and to provide relief to distressed
populations. Despite their smaller and less influential power base, liberal
humanitarianists proved to be an increasing threat to the selective engager camp.
Liberal humanitarianists argued that in addition to being an issue of human right,
US interests were at stake. Without opposition, Milošević would inevitably turn
on the Albanians in Kosovo, sparking regional wars that would, in fact, directly
affect US interests.
In 1991, Deputy Secretary of State and former ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Lawrence Eagleburger took a trip to the region and warned Milošević against
using violence. Milošević, however, was unaffected by international pressure for
two reasons; first he was aware that verbal warnings would not be follow by any
military action, and second he was more concerned with his campaign of ethnic
cleansing than with his reputation in the international community. Upon his
return, Eagleburger informed Bush that there was little the US could do, as any
action would fail and essentially be harmful to the US in the process.
As the situations in both Bosnia and Somalia unfolded, the Bush
administration was initially able to frame both as conflicts fueled by ancient tribal
and ethnic hatreds, in which case US involvement could accomplish very little.
Throughout the first four months of the Bosnian conflict, the American public
largely supported the Bush administration’s selective engagement policy. Very
little information emanated from the conflict contradicting the legitimacy of the
administration’s policy decisions. "The intelligence community is responsive to
what the bosses want to know. You could say 'I'm deeply interested in a greeneyed abominable snowman,' and you'd get all the briefings you could ever want.
But when the higher-ups are blaming the killings on the victims, you aren't going
to get much intelligence."9
Initially no one was in a position to challenge the administration’s
paradigmatic framing of the situation in Bosnia for several key reasons. In the
9
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spring of 1992 when war broke out in Bosnia, no precedent had been set for postCold War humanitarian intervention despite rising emphasis on human rights.
This complexity was magnified by the fact that SFRY had been an economically
and politically advanced society prior to the outbreak of war. This meant there
had been no previous need for humanitarian or non-governmental presence,
immensely restricting the amount of knowledge that existed surrounding the
conflict. Additionally, only a small number of Congressmen had any interest or
knowledge of the events in Bosnia, and the few who did had no organized base
from which to mobilize public and political support for intervention.
The American public was told that the situation in Bosnia constituted a
humanitarian ‘nightmare’ or a civil war, but not genocide. The Bush
administration made a calculated decision not to use the term genocide when
describing events in Bosnia, as the use of the world would denote a moral
obligation to intervene.
The Bush administration portrayed the events unfolding in Bosnia in three
ways to support its selective engagement policy and satisfy the increasingly
important moral obligation to protect human rights. Primarily, the events were
depicted as a tragedy, stemming from civil war and ethnic hatred. Secondly, the
administration emphasized the perverse consequences for both Muslims and
peacekeepers, which would result from any confrontation with the Serbs. Finally,
the lack of military involvement was justified in relation to post-Vietnam foreign
policy perspectives, threatening that involvement would result in another bloody
quagmire costing many innocent lives and ultimately ending unsuccessfully.
Instead of using military force to protect the Bosnian people, the Bush
administration took a non-violent approach: withdrawing their ambassador from
Yugoslavia, closing two consulates in Serbia, expelling the Yugoslav ambassador
from the US and moving military forces into the Adriatic to enforce the arms
embargo. However, none of those diplomatic soft -actions had any effect on
Milošević who considered the consequences an acceptable cost associated with
the process of establishing an ethnically clean state.
General Colin Powell was also a strong force in preventing any
governmental action in Bosnia. His well-known foreign policy strategy, the
“Powell Doctrine,” constructed a framework for intervention which consisted of
four qualifications: first, ample troops must be available so that the deployment
can be carried out with overwhelming force; second, the political and military
objectives must be clearly defined; third, the mission must be achievable; and,
finally, public and congressional support must be widespread. Powell asserted
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steadfastly that the classification of the Bosnian situation as a civil war meant
intervention would be messy and unsuccessful.
Despite this argument however, many sources suggested the opposite,
insisting that intervention was possible without risking another U.S. entanglement
in a Vietnam-like quagmire. Proponents of this belief suggested that if the U.S.
focused its intervention on Serb aggression and Milosevic, directing a targeted
military strike against him and radical Serb supporters, violence in Bosnia could
be mitigated with relative rapidity.
As the crises in Somalia and Bosnia continued into 1992, liberal
humanitarianists and the media began compiling their own independent
knowledge about the situations, challenging the way that selective engagers had
framed the situation. Together they were able to reframe the conflicts as highly
coordinated and violent campaigns aimed at eliminating Muslims and Croats in
Bosnia. As the information from these groups amassed and continued to challenge
the administration’s portrayal of the situation, pressure began to mount for
intervention.
When intense shelling began in the western enclave of Sarajevo, the media
coverage was massive. The American public demanded to know what actions the
Bush administration would take to mitigate the bloodshed in Bosnia. Regardless
of rising pressure, the administration maintained its position, insisting that
intervention ran contrary to U.S. national interest and that any military
intervention would be unsuccessful due to the nature of the conflict. The
administration promised to continue providing humanitarian aid, supporting
diplomatic soft-responses and maintaining economic sanctions, but that would be
the extent of their involvement.
However, as media coverage started to unearth the existence of Serb-run
concentration camps in Bosnia in early August, the world responded in outrage.
Immense pressure and opposition to U.S. neutrality forced Bush to responded,
vowing not to rest until the international community gained access to and
evacuated the Serb camps. While the reaction to the camps signified growing
knowledge of the situation within the U.S. and abroad in the international
community, little was still known about the larger issue surrounding the camps.
Thus, liberal humanitarianists intensified their pressure on the Bush
administration to intervene in Bosnia. The portrayal of the situation by liberal
humanitarianists as a calculated and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing was
reinforced as information of the camps emerged. The images emanating from the
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camps proved conclusive of accusations that the Bush administration was
deliberately distorting the situation in Bosnia in order to justify neutrality.
By the time of the Republican Nation Convention in 1992, it was
becoming undeniably clear that liberal humanitarianists were defining the public
image of the Bosnian situation. The Bush administration was receiving heavy
criticism for his foreign policy decisions, even among highly respected policy
commentators. Afraid that his presidential legacy would reflect these negative
policy reviews, Bush was aware that he would have to lead some form of
humanitarian intervention, demonstrating the power of an engaged citizenry to
influence public policy.
Public support for intervention escalated and Clinton won election on
Nov, 3 1992, seemingly bringing humanitarian intervention to the forefront of the
political agenda. The Bush administration understood that liberal humanitarianists
would rule both the White House and Congress and pursue a strong campaign for
humanitarian involvement. Given the situation, and wanting to avoid an
unfavorable foreign policy reputation, the Bush administration decided
intervention was necessary. As intervention in Somalia required less effort and the
situation was less complex, the Bush administration announced on November 21,
1992 that it would send 25,000 troops to Somalia.
Intervention in Somalia, which Clinton inherited, was deemed a failure by
most. U.S. efforts did little to remedy the situation and the withdrawal of troops
resulted in significant Somali casualties. Failure in Somalia temporarily
diminished U.S. public and political support for intervention in Bosnia.
By the time Clinton took office in January of 1993, the Serbs had already
extensively carried out their campaign of ethnic cleansing and occupied almost
three-quarters of Bosnia. Throughout his campaign, Clinton had gained much
support based on his promises for intervention and military force in Bosnia.
Despite this, however, upon entering office, Clinton found that there was still
strong opposition challenging intervention. Due to the persistent reluctance, even
at this point in the situation, the Clinton administration adopted new terms with to
frame the situation, emphasizing the complexities and ancient historical roots.
Using words like “tragedy” instead of “terror” or “genocide” eliminated any
moral obligation U.S. citizens felt to intervene. Clinton recognized the campaign
of ethnic cleansing, but made a clear point to distinguish it from genocide. He
recognized the situation but like Bush, argued that U.S. involvement would do
little to mitigate the situation. Clinton justified not liberating the Serb
concentration camps the same way the international community justified not
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liberating concentration camps during WWII asserting that Serb retaliation would
result in the deaths of thousands of prisoners.
Within the same timeframe, media coverage shifted from written reports
and rumors to televised images of the situation, which resonated much more
deeply among the American people. Simultaneously, Serb forces began targeting
US and international reporters. The culmination of these two events resulted in a
surge in US support for intervention in Bosnia. In May, 1993 Clinton agreed to a
plan for intervention in Bosnia called the “lift and strike.” This plan included
convincing the UN to lift the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, allowing Bosnian
Muslims access to weapons, and then bombing the Serbs. However, this plan of
action was quickly rejected by the European Union (EU).
Despite the fact that Clinton sympathized with Bosnia, three key factors
influenced his inactivity and hesitation to intervene. Primarily, the military was
adamantly opposed to intervention. Clinton and his senior advisors lacked
experience with military operations, resulting in heavy reliance upon his military
advisors. General Powell, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
was opposed to any military action which did not have clearly defined benefits for
the US. This relationship was extremely influential in shaping Clinton’s actions.
Secondly, Clinton’s foreign policy advisors were devoted multi-lateralists who
refused to act without the consent of the EU. Finally, Clinton was afraid that
although support for intervention was high, it was not strong enough to withstand
the death toll that would result inescapably from contributing ground forces to
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Additionally, due to failures in Somalia and
Haiti, Clinton’s foreign policy was under heavy fire domestically.
Failed U.S. interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo resulted in
the establishment of a dangerous foreign policy precedent. The “Clinton
Doctrine” is a neo-Wilsonian approach to humanitarian and human rights
intervention. It concludes that the U.S. cannot respond to all humanitarian crises
or human rights transgressions, and thus it will only use its power if doing so will
make a difference and the costs are acceptable.
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations didn’t play any role in the situation in Bosnia until as
late as September of 1991, when war had already broken out in Croatia. In
addition to their late response, initial UN action was tepid at best, as the UN
Security Council adopted resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on all of
SFRY. At the time the UN adopted resolution 713, it had already been established
with relative certainty that Milošević would not be swayed by anything short of
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aggressive military confrontation, rendering the embargo relatively ineffective.
The embargo did however have perverse negative consequences on the Muslim
and Croat populations within Bosnia. Since the Bosnian Serb army was backed by
the mainly Serb Yugoslav National Army (JNA) it had no trouble obtaining
weapons, enforcing Serb military superiority in Bosnia. The Muslims and Croats
on the other hand were rendered essentially defenseless as a result of the embargo,
as they had no ability to obtain weapons and thus no means to defend themselves.
Following the adoption of the embargo, in October of 1992 the SecretaryGeneral of the UN appointed an envoy for Yugoslavia headed by former U.S.
secretary of state Cyrus Vance. Vance managed to negotiate a cease-fire which
temporarily halted hostilities in Croatia. Upon the negotiation of the so-called
“Vance Plan,” the UN Security Council adopted resolution 743, organizing UN
Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) which would be deployed to certain areas of
Croatia to enforce the cease fire.
As the situation in Bosnia escalated, the already insufficiently armed
UNPROFOR mandate was extended into Bosnia. The new mandate permitted
UNPROFOR to take control of the Sarajevo airport in order to ensure the delivery
of humanitarian relief supplies, protect convoys of the International Committee of
Red Cross (ICRC) delivering released civilian detainees and support the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as it delivered humanitarian
aid to various parts of Bosnia.
In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 819 and 836, which
established UN protected
“Safe Areas” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
territories, which were supposed to be protected by UNPROFOR upon the
establishment of safe areas, included Bihać in the west, Tuzla in the northeast,
Goražde, Žepa and Srebrenica in the east and Sarajevo, the capital. The resolution
failed to establish a specific procedure by which the safe areas would be
protected, particularly in a warzone like Bosnia. The international community and
the populations in the Safe Areas expected the UNPROFOR troops to protect
them from Serb aggression, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and
potentially transport them to safer areas. However, the lightly armed UNPROFOR
forces supported by a weak mandate did not have the power or absolute authority
to deliver on any of these expectations.
In addition to being one of the most controversial decisions made by the
UN, the establishment of safe areas created diplomatic tensions within the
international community. Member states who voted in favor of the safe area
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resolution were for the most part unwilling to take substantial action to ensure
their safety.
In 1995, the situation in UN Safe Areas was deteriorating. The Srebrenica
massacre represented one of the worst atrocities to occur in Europe since WWII,
resulting in the deaths of over 8,000 civilians.10 Continued attacks on UN Safe
Areas, in addition to the Srebrenica massacre and the continued siege of Sarajevo,
demonstrated the failure of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and eventually
resulted in NATO intervention. By the end of the war, each of the six UN
established Safe Areas had been attacked by Serb forces and they had conquered
control of Srebrenica and Žepa.
Two key factors are responsible for the inability of UNPROFOR forces to
protect the Bosnian people. First, UN troops were lightly armed and extremely
undermanned. The initial request for forces estimated that 30,000 troops were
needed to effectively protect the Safe Areas from Serb aggression, of which the
UN Security Council approved only 7,400 troops. However, since the US refused
to contribute peacekeeping troops and the EU was nearly depleted only 3,400
troops were ever deployed.11 The UNPROFOR troops were immensely underarmed and under-manned rendering them incapable of protecting the populations
within the Safe Areas. Any substantial involvement would risk armed conflict
with Serb troops who had a significant military superiority. Secondly, the UN
definition of peacekeeping and the UNPROFOR mandate crippled the troops’
efforts to protect the Bosnian people. Peacekeeping is defined by the United
Nations as, "Unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a
way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace.” 12
Since enforcing peace was not part of the UNPROFOR mandate, UNPROFOR
forces were not allowed to engage in combat with any of the major factions
involved unless directly attacked, as this could be immediately considered
sacrificing their objectivity. Objectivity, which is one of the foundational pillars
of the UN peacekeeping proved detrimental to the UN’s ability to successfully
mitigate genocide in Bosnia.
In the face of mounting casualties and diminishing UN control,
UNPROFOR troops were withdrawn, leaving the populations of the six UN Safe
10
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Areas to fend for themselves. In situations where direct UN involvement is either
inappropriate or unfeasible, as it proved to be in Bosnia, the Security Council
authorizes regional organizations such as NATO to undertake peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement tasks.
VIII. ROLE OF NATO
The post-Cold War transformation of NATO played a significant role in
shaping NATO involvement during the Bosnian genocide. During the Cold War,
NATO served as a strong and authoritative defensive military alliance, and played
a vital role in stabilizing Atlantic relations and Western Europe. NATO’s powerbinding and restraining function was also vital in shaping the conclusion of the
Cold War in so far as it tied Germany to the West, Europe and the US. NATO
provided the necessary institutional framework that both facilitated the unification
of Germany and provided reassurance to the Soviet Union and Western allies.
The peaceful resolution of the Cold War required that Germany be
included in NATO, a decision which required Soviet endorsement. In order to
agree to German inclusion in NATO, the Soviet Union stipulated that NATO’s
mission be recast. At the July 1990 NATO summit in London, NATO members
agreed upon the reforms in the Four Power Compromise. Even before the collapse
of East Germany in November of 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had
argued for the evolution of NATO into a political organization, and less of a
military organization geared towards confrontation with the Soviet Union, Thus,
two main reforms which defined the transformation of NATO included: an
invitation to Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries to establish permanent liaison
missions to NATO, and the reorganization and downsizing of NATO’s forces to
rely on multinational troops, in an attempt to bring German forces into more close
cohesion with the NATO command structures. Ironically, the transformation of
NATO has threatened the institutional components, which made it such a
successful stabilizing power through the Cold War.
While the changes agreed upon in the Four Power Compromise facilitated
the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War, the long term consequences to NATO’s
ability to serve as an international peacekeeping and protective institution were
extensively harmed. Due to its reformation as a more political organization,
NATO has lost most of its ability to defend its members from territorial attack.
Additionally, the decreased defensive capabilities of NATO have made its power
much more controversial and uncertain, factors that were intensified by the
confusion and lack of leadership in the post-Cold War global order.
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Due to the failing UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, NATO’s first
involvement came in February of 1992, when it issued a statement advising all
involved opposition to allow the deployment of UN peacekeepers. While this
initial statement was largely symbolic, it provided a basis for future NATO
involvement in Bosnia. In July of 1992, at a meeting in Helsinki, Finland, UN
foreign ministers agreed to aid the UN in its efforts to monitor compliance with
sanctions established in UN Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 757
(1992). NATO assistance took the shape of Operation Maritime Monitor, which
was based off the coast of Montenegro. In October of 1992, the UN Security
Council passed resolution 781 which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Responding quickly NATO expanded its mission to include
Operation Sky Monitor on October 16th, 1992.
A month later on November 16th, 1992, NATO’s mission evolved from a
monitoring mission to an enforcement mission with the passage of UN Security
Council resolution 787. Resolution 787 authorized all member states to inspect all
incoming and outgoing cargo vessels to ensure their compliance with the UNimposed sanctions. In response to its evolving mission, NATO established
Operation Maritime Guard. Shortly after, NATO’s air mission also evolved into
an enforcement mission. With the issuing of resolution 816, the UN Security
Council authorized states to use the necessary measure to ensure compliance with
the no-fly zones. In April of 1993, NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight
which enforced the no-fly zones with regionally based fighter aircraft.
Through 1993 the role of NATO in Bosnia continued to grow steadily. On
June 10th NATO agreed to provide air support for UNPROFOR troops upon a
request from the UN. Then on February 28, 1994 NATO involvement escalated.
NATO troops operating under Operation Deny Flight shot down four Serb jets
near Banja Luka, Bosnia. As the first combat operation in NATO’s history, the
events of February 28th allowed for further growth of NATO’s role in Bosnia.
The height of NATO involvement peaked with the creation of Operation
Deliberate Force, which was carried out from August 30, 1995 to September 20,
1995. The mission was designed to protect the Safe Areas from increasing Serb
threats and aggression. By its conclusion, Operation Deliberate Force had utilized
four-hundred aircraft and 15,000 personnel from fifteen different nations.13
During the campaign 3,515 sorties were flown against 338 individual targets.
Operation Deliberate Force along with increased international pressure on
Milošević to participate in negotiations resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement
in November of 1995.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The most important conclusion which can be drawn from this research is
that no mechanism exists today to promote and protect human rights which is not
reliant on entities outside of the peacekeeping body itself. In reality, the authority
and efficacy of any international peacekeeping body to respond to situations of
humanitarian crisis depends largely on the diplomatic culture and domestic
politics of involved countries at that time, and the engagement of the citizenry
within each country. This fact is contradictory to the philosophy of peacekeeping
organizations in themselves, as human rights are theoretically absolute and
separate of all political interests.
In addition to revealing the lack of a legitimate peacekeeping body in the
world, this research also illuminates the dangerous precedent which was set
during the Bosnian genocide. The lack of public scrutiny surrounding inaction in
Bosnia demonstrated to policy makers globally that they would not be held
accountable for refusing to protect human rights. This precedent has been
exploited in every situation of humanitarian crisis since Bosnia. Policy makers
have come to pursue human rights only when they coincide with political or
economic incentives, unless heavily pressured by their citizens.
If, in a time when human rights were at the forefront of global politics, the
international community still allowed genocide to be carried out in a developed
European country without any legitimate intervention, little hope remains for the
future of humanitarian intervention unless international peacekeeping bodies are
radically reformed and the citizens of the world become perpetually engaged and
active.
In order to eliminate the moral ambiguity surrounding the categorization
of genocide, it is necessary for there to be a mechanism of global understanding
which would be responsible for providing sufficient, unbiased and legitimate
knowledge of situations of humanitarian abuses. This mechanism should be part
of an international peacekeeping body with no specific obligation to any one
country or group of countries.
In order for a peacekeeping body to truly be efficient, it requires a clearly
defined and articulated mandate with an established framework for action.
Additionally, any peacekeeping body needs absolute and certain authority to act
in accordance to its mandate, free of diplomatic and political pressures. The
efficacy of an international peacekeeping body requires that the sole goal of its
existence is the protection and promotion of human rights in the global
community. Such a body needs to be equally represented by the international
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community, ensuring that once country doesn’t have unequivocal power over the
decisions that are made. The existence of an internationally ratified mechanism
for investigating situations of humanitarian ambiguity and classifying such
situations as either genocide or war crimes would define the moral obligation of
the international community. Since there is no ambiguity surrounding the
categorization of genocide under these circumstances, there would also be no
ambiguity surround the international community’s obligation to intervene and,
more specifically, a nation’s responsibility to intervene.
X. EPILOGUE
This paper is relevant to global citizenship because it illustrates the role a
globally aware and engaged citizenry plays in promoting humanitarian
intervention. The Bosnian situation demonstrates that without public scrutiny
policy makers globally are not held accountable for refusing to protect human
rights. Unless they are heavily pressured by their citizens, policy makers pursue
human rights only when they coincide with political or economic incentives. It is
in this capacity that being a globally engaged and aware citizen has its largest
impact. If we act as citizens not of our specific nations, but rather as citizens of
the world, making it our responsibility to be aware of the situations of
humanitarian crisis around our world; when we bring the pressure of public
scrutiny to policy makers, we are able to pressure our governments to place the
protection of human rights at the top of their national agendas.
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